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Abstract—Due to the fourth industrial revolution, and the
resulting increase in interconnectivity, industrial networks are
more and more opened to publicly available networks. Apart
from the huge benefit in manageability and flexibility, the
openness also results in a larger attack surface for malicious
adversaries. In comparison to office environments, industrial
networks have very high volumes of data. In addition to that,
every delay will most likely lead to loss of revenue. Hence,
intrusion detection systems for industrial applications have differ-
ent requirements than office-based intrusion detection systems.
On the other hand, industrial networks are able to provide a
lot of contextual information due to manufacturing execution
systems and enterprise resource planning. Additionally, industrial
networks tend to be more uniform, making it easier to determine
outliers. In this work, an abstract simulation of industrial
network behaviour is created. Malicious actions are introduced
into a set of sequences of valid behaviour. Finally, a context-based
and context-less intrusion detection system is used to find the
attacks. The results are compared and commented. It can be seen
that context information can help in identifying malicious actions
more reliable than intrusion detection with only one source of
information, e.g. the network.
Index Terms—Context-aware anomaly detection, Intrusion De-
tection System, Simulation, IT-Security, Industrial Application
I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing interconnectivity and the opening of
industrial networks to the outside creates the need for security
measures. Such measures, e.g. firewall, antivirus software
or Intrusion Detection System (IDS), have been used in
office Information Technology (IT) for a long time. They
are, however, new to industrial applications. Security was not
an issue in industry for two reasons [1]: First, Supervisory
Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems were
physically separated from the internet. And second, each
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system is unique due to its singular purpose, making it hard
for an attacker to exploit it. Both assumptions hold no longer
true as the recent and not-so-recent spectacularly show. This
lead to the drastic increase in software and network security
for industrial applications. Since industrial networks are
different in structure and purpose than office networks, the
same solutions cannot be transferred readily. Instead, new
security solutions have to be developed. Industrial networks
are highly specialised, creating unique but very repetitive
traffic [2]. Furthermore, industrial networks are connected to
Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs), meaning they are intended to
interact with the real world. And lastly, most protocols in the
industrial environment do not employ security mechanisms
such as authentication and encryption [3], [4], as is standard
in the office world.
This work is structured as follows. In section II, the state of
the art is described. After that, the use case that is considered
in this work is introduced in section III. The corresponding
formal model is derived in section IV. In section V, the anal-
ysis is conducted and the results are presented. A conclusion
is drawn in section VI.
II. STATE OF THE ART
There are many different approaches for IDSs; Luh et al.
categorized them in their survey Semantics-aware detection
of targeted attacks into different groups [5]. They identified
the main categories “Host-based”, “Network-based” and
“Multi-source” with several sub-categories. As we focus
our work on industry networks and their components, we
will not focus on individual IDSs for specific hosts, but on
Multi-source and Network-based approaches. One popular
implementation of a Network-based IDS is Snort by Cisco
[6], which has grown from a lightweight IDS to a tool that can
be used as a full-grown network-based Intrusion Prevention
System (IPS). The signature-based approach utilizes user
contributed rules to catch different specific instances of
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network attacks. Another well known network monitoring
framework, which can be used as a network IDS, is Bro [7].
Bro is split into layers, where the “Event Engine” performs
several integrity checks before it handles the packets sent
between senders an recievers that are organised as touples
– Bro decides if it should return the whole packet, just the
header or nothing at all, depending on the used protocol.
The “Policy Script Interpreter”-layer is used to check if the
handled packets generated any events that were specified
before and then decides if a Bro script should be executed.
These scripts can include several tasks like generating new
events, logging functions and modifying internal states. There
are more popular open source network IDSs like Suricata,
which was first released in 2010 by the Open Information
Security Foundation (OISF) [8], and Kismet, which aims at
wireless networks [9].
According to Jyothsna et al., another method to categorize
IDSs is by classifying them into “signature based detection”
and “anomaly based detection” [10]. While the first group
looks for patterns of known attacks and compares them with
the active system, the latter category – the anomaly based
approach – builds a model of the normal behaviour and
matches this learned behaviour with the running system.
While the first approach can’t find novel attacks, the second
one needs training on a normal behaving system. According
to Thames and Schaefer, the requirements for security aspects
differ in many points for CPS and regular IT systems [11]. As
we focus primarily on industry networks with heterogeneous
participants like Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs),
Industrial Personal Computers (IPCs) and CPSs with different
operating systems, used protocols and various available
resources, we have to use a more adjustable approach.
To address these problems we used an approach
with Hidden Markov-Models (HMMs) that uses context
information. An approach for the usage of Markov chains
was published by Ye [12]. In her paper A Markov Chain
Model of Temporal Behavior for Anomaly Detection she
introduced her technique where the system learns from
historic data to distinguish between normal behavior and
intrusive activities. Due further developed that approach in
[13] to a HMM IDS to learn patterns of Unix processes. Hu et
al. introduced an IDS that uses system call based HMMs [14].
They focussed on reducing the amount of submodels required
to model the scenario and the impact of pre-processing data
on training time. Yolac¸an suggested in his approach to enrich
the data with context information [15].
The above mentioned IDSs are host-based and do not
focus on other available data sources like network traffic.
More recent research also show first advances in the field of
HMMs in network-based intrusion detection. Chen proposed
a classification method for detecting attacks in different attack
stages within regular IT networks [16]. Zohrevand used HMMs
to develop a system for anomaly detection in water supply
SCADA systems showing that their approach outperforms
other contestants making HMMs a feasible approach also for
industrial networks [17].
III. USE CASE DESCRIPTION
There are numerous possible attack vectors on industrial
applications. As described in section I, each company’s net-
work is different and therefore a wholesome security solution
is infeasible. As we described in previous works, there are,
however, common attack motivations and attacker types [18].
Some attackers aim at extracting information, so-called “espi-
onage”. Others try to cause harm, in covert operations or in
the open, so-called “sabotage”. Not only the goals, but also the
means of achieving them are numerous and strongly depend
on the use case. Therefore, creating a model that covers all
possible attacker scenarios is impracticable. Instead, we focus
on a subset of all attacks and describe a special manifestation
of sabotage. We consider an attack scenario where an attacker
reprograms a PLC. This reprogramming leads to unexpected
behaviour of the CPS with the potential to cause harm and
damage. In our opinion, there are two scenarios how the
attacker is able to reprogram the PLC, and four possible ways
to detect this attack. An attacker can either
• take over a valid programming device and use it mali-
ciously or
• introduce a malicious device to the network.
How she circumvents the perimeter is beyond the scope of
this work, there are several related works discussing physical
and network security [19]. Furthermore, the given attack can
be detected in one of four ways.
a) Identity: If each programming device and PLC is
provided with a cryptographically secure identity, the adver-
sary has to break it. With state of the art authentication,
this can be considered impossible. However, most industrial
applications rarely use authentication on devices [3]. This
detection mechanism only discovers attacks by an attacker that
introduced a malicious device. If malicious programming is
executed with a valid device, a valid identity is provided.
b) Statistically: Depending on the way an attacker re-
programs devices, statistical deviations from normal behaviour
could be observed. This is possible for both ways an attacker
can modify the system as described above, but only if the
attacker significantly differs from the standard system be-
haviour. A Dolev-Yao intruder model [20] assumes the attacker
possesses knowledge of the system, enabling her to perfectly
mimic the standard behaviour.
c) Payload-based: Deep packet inspection is employed
by several IDS to discover content that is capable of causing
harm to a system. In industrial applications, a complex model
of the production facility is necessary to determine which
parameters can cause damage. Even more, a value that is well
within safety boundaries can still lead to the production of
goods that are low quality. Therefore, it is difficult to determine
malicious traffic by payload in industrial applications.
d) Context-based: Sometimes, information about
network traffic alone is not enough to discover attacks. In
this case, adding context information can enrich the data
source and help to provide a broader view on a system. This
principle is employed by Security Information and Event
Management (SIEM) systems.
In this work, we assume that no identity information is
provided, allowing an attacker to spoof entities in the network.
Furthermore, we assume she does not strictly stick to the
standard system behaviour, creating statistical deviations that
could be detectable. We then compare the statistical analysis
with context-based analysis.
IV. FORMAL MODEL
For analysis, a formal model was created. The formal model
was used to generate data, as well as to analyse the data with
respect to anomalies induced by attacks. The model consists
of three parts:
• Products
• IPCs
• PLCs
The products symbolise the intended output of a fictional pro-
duction process. Depending on the change of product, several
IPCs have to be reconfigured. These IPCs that are reconfigured
are a subset of all available IPCs. Each IPC controls four PLCs
that are reprogrammed in case of reconfiguration. The order
of reprogramming the PLCs follows a probability distribution
defined by a HMM [21]. A HMM λ is defined in equation 1.
λ = (S, V,A,B, pi) (1)
• S = {PLC1,1, ..., PLCi,j},
• V = id(S),
• A ∈ R(i·j)×(i·j), the state transition matrix,
• B ∈ R(i·j)×(i·j), the observation matrix,
• pi ∈ R(i·j), the starting distribution describes the proba-
bility pin = P (X1 = sn) of the first state to be sn
i is the Number of IPCs and j the Number of PLCs per
IPC. id() is a function that maps a PLC to a unique identifier
as each PLC only outputs its identifier.
V. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The model introduced in section IV was implemented with
specific parameters:
• 3 products being produced by
• 5 IPCs controlling
• 4 PLCs each
The products are chosen randomly, following a Markov
process [22]. The possible transitions are shown in figure 1,
the corresponding transition probabilities are shown in
table II. In total, 24 different setups were simulated and
analysed. These setups consist of two ways the attacker
reprograms the PLCs, three different numbers of malicious
actions introduced, and four ways the IPCs are reconfigured
and reprogram the PLCs due to the change of product. The
simulation setups are an abstraction of real-world behaviour.
As explained in section III, an operator knowing every
transition of her system would be able to detect any attack,
unless the attacker also knew the transitions and was able to
mimic this behaviour. In this case, the operator could only
tell valid from malicious attacks by consulting the necessity
of changing states due to changes in production.
The goal of this simulation is to derive the importance of
context information for detection of various malicious traffic
in different kinds of valid traffic. We first created a set of
sequences of valid actions and transitions. The transitions
were saved in one, respectively three matrices. The first
matrix contained all transitions, regardless of the product to
be produced. The three matrices contained the transitions for
the correlating product, introducing the notion of context. In
the real world, this kind of information is easily accessible
via Manufacturing Execution System (MES) and Enterprise
Resource Planning (ERP), as, for example, proposed in [23].
First, the matrices were initialised by 10 000 cycles of product
change. Normalisation was applied to the matrices. Then
we inserted first one, then two and finally four malicious
packets into each sequence of the set. After that, the transition
probabilities of the malicious actions were calculated. The
probabilities of the attacks, as well as the valid actions, were
compared to a threshold varying from 0 to 1 in steps of
0.05. This allowed for the calculation of Receiver Operating
Characteristics (ROCs), as well as the f-measure. The f-
measure, or F1-score, is a metric to determine the quality of
a classifier [24], as written in equation 2.
F1 = 2 · precision · recall
precision+ recall
precision =
tp
tp + fp
recall =
tp
tp + fn
(2)
One of the most noteworthy properties of a Markov model
is its inability to contain memory of states before the previous
one, the so-called Markov property. This means that each
transition probability only depends on the previous state,
completely independent of its predecessors before the current
state. This behaviour is noted mathematically in equation 3.
The transition probabilities of each state transition only con-
sider the previous state. where p is a matrix of transition
probabilities, P the probability of an event, X an event, s
a state and t a time step.
pi,j = P (Xt+1 = sj |Xt = si)
i, j = 1, ...,m
(3)
Each sequence of malicious programming actions was con-
sidered an attack and should have been found. It was, however,
sufficient to detect one malicious segment within a sequence.
In reality, finding only one of a series of malicious program-
ming actions would be sufficient to raise awareness for an
attack. First, we analyse attacks that are introduced to several
scenarios in static order in subsection V-A. Then, attacks that
are introduced into the same scenarios in different order are
examined in subsection V-B. The results are presented in
subsection V-C.
A. Attacks in Static Order
In these setups, the attacks always were in a static order.
In turn, one, two and four attacks were introduced into four
different kinds of valid actions.
a) Setup 1: The IPCs that are reconfigured for each
product are shown in table I. If a product is selected, the
IPCs are reconfigured in their numerical order. The products
are randomly chosen with probabilities as listed in table II,
Upon reconfiguration, each IPC reprograms its corresponding
PLCs. This reprogramming process is depicted in figure 2,
the according transition probabilities are listed in table IV.
The given probability distribution allows for some PLCs to
not be reprogrammed. This behaviour is supposed to create a
small uncertainty that, in reality, could arise from maintenance
or reprogramming steps that were undergone. Still, one major
difference between office- and industrial-IT lies in the repeti-
tive traffic as described in section I. This repetitive behaviour
is modelled by reconfiguring the same IPCs in the same order
for each product and the order of reprograming of the PLCs.
Fig. 1. Product Transitions
The ROCs for one malicious action in each sequence can be
found in figure 3. It can be seen that they are 1 almost instantly.
This is due to the fact that the valid behaviour is relatively
uniform, making it easy to detect malicious activities. For two
and four malicious actions in each sequence, the ROC starts
even higher.
TABLE I
IPCS THAT ARE PROGRAMMED FOR EACH INDIVIDUAL PRODUCT
Product 1 Product 2 Product 3
IPC 1 x x
IPC 2 x x
IPC 3 x x
IPC 4 x
IPC 5 x x
TABLE II
TRANSITION PROBABLITIES FOR THE PRODUCTS
Product 1 Product 2 Product 3
Product 1 0.6 0.2 0.2
Product 2 0.4 0.6 0
Product 3 0.6 0.2 0.2
In addition to the ROC, the f-measure is shown in figure 4.
The difference of f-measure for context-less and context-based
approach is depicted as well.
Because of the higher number of false positives for the
context-less approach, the f-measure of the context-based
approach is better in for certain thresholds. With increasing
threshold, however, the difference decreases as an increasing
threshold leads to less transitions that fit. The difference of
f-measures looks similar for all numbers of malicious actions
in this setup.
b) Setup 2: In this setup, the same IPCs as in the
previous one are reconfigured when switching products. They
are summarised in table II. They, however, reprogram their
corresponding PLCs always in strict order. The ROC imme-
diately reaches close to one, the diagram is therefore omitted.
The f-measures are shown in figure 5. In the pictured scenario,
four attacks were introduced into every sequence. The other
scenarios look very much alike.
Sometimes, the f-measure of the approach without context
seems to be greater than one. This is a result of plotting
inaccuracy, as the f-measure always results to a value between
zero and one.
The strict order of valid actions makes it very easy to
distinguish malicious from valid actions, leading to such high
TABLE III
STARTING PROBABILITIES FOR THE PRODUCTS
Product 1 Product 2 Product 3
0.8 0.1 0.1
TABLE IV
TRANSITION PROBABILITIES FOR THE PLCS
Start PLC 1 PLC 2 PLC 3 PLC 4 Finish
Start 0 0.9 0.1 0 0 0
PLC 1 0 0 0.9 0.1 0 0
PLC 2 0 0 0 0.6 0.4 0
PLC 3 0 0 0 0 0.9 0.1
PLC 4 0 0 0 0 0 1
Finish 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fig. 2. PLC Transitions
Fig. 3. ROCs for One Attack in Setup 1
Fig. 4. Difference of f-measures for One Attack in Setup 1
true positive values of both approaches. Furthermore, the
increase of the difference towards high thresholds results in the
faster increase of false positive detections for the context-less
approach. While both methods perform very good in terms of
true positives, the context-based method is better with respect
to choosing less false positives.
c) Setup 3: In this setup, each change of products led
to reconfiguration of all IPCs and thus reprogramming of all
PLCs. The PLCs in turn are reprogrammed in strict numeric
order. However, the order of reconfiguration varied, depending
on the product. It can be found in table V.
Again, the ROC starts with one due to the high true
Fig. 5. Difference of f-measures for One Attack in Setup 2
TABLE V
ORDER OF RECONFIGURING IPCS PER PRODUCT
first second third fourth fifth
Product 1 IPC 1 IPC 2 IPC 3 IPC 4 IPC 5
Product 2 IPC 5 IPC 4 IPC 3 IPC 1 IPC 1
Product 3 IPC 1 IPC 5 IPC 2 IPC 4 IPC 3
positive rate. There is, however, a significant deviation in the
f-measure, as exemplarily shown in figure 6 for four attacks
per sequence.
Fig. 6. Difference of f-measures for One Attack in Setup 3
The difference in the f-measures indicates an outperfor-
mance with respect to false positives by the context-based
approach.
d) Setup 4: In this setup, upon change of product, each
IPC was reconfigured, as described in table V. The order of
reprogramming the PLCs was completely random. In figure 7,
the ROCs for all numbers of malicious actions, with and
without the notion of context, respectively, are drawn. It can
be seen that there is a break even point, where the curves align.
Before that, detection with the notion of context outperforms
detection without consideration of context.
Fig. 7. All ROCs in Setup 4
The f-measures, depicted in figure 8 for one malicious
action per valid sequence, indicate a lower performance than
in the previous setups. The difference is located in the low
thresholds, due to the better performance with respect to false
positives of the context-based approach. The comparatively
worse performance is a result of the randomness of valid
actions.
Fig. 8. Difference of f-measures for One Attack in Setup 4
B. Attacks in Random Order
In these setups, the attacks always were in random order.
In turn, one, two and four attacks were introduced into four
different kinds of valid actions.
a) Setup 1: The reconfiguration pattern of IPCs is similar
to the one described in table I of Setup 1 in subsection V-A,
with product transition probabilities as described in table II.
The reprogramming pattern of the PLCs is shown in figure 2.
the according transition probabilities can be found in table IV.
The results are similar as well, the ROCs saturate almost from
the beginning, as can be seen in figure 9.
Fig. 9. ROCs for One Attack in Setup 1
There is a small difference, however, in the f-measure of
detection with and without the notion of context. As shown in
figure 10, the detection without context slightly outperforms
the detection without context in threshold ranges between 0.05
and 0.3.
Fig. 10. Difference of f-measures for One Attack in Setup 1
b) Setup 2: As in Setup 2 of subsection V-A, upon
reconfiguration of an IPC, according to tables I and II, all
its PLCs are reprogrammed in strict order. The ROCs of one,
two and four attacks per sequence start with one, depicting
them is therefore of little interest. Due to the false positives,
however, the f-measure values differ, especially with threshold
greater than 0.2. This behaviour is shown in figure 11.
c) Setup 3: As with Setup 3 in subsection V-A, in this
setup, all IPCs are reconfigured when the product is switched.
The order of reconfiguration for each product can be found
in table V. The corresponding PLCs are reprogrammed in
numeric order, respectively. The ROCs converge immediately.
There can, however, be found significant differences in the f-
measures, as shown in figure 12. Especially the area between
0.4 and 0.6 shows a difference due to false negatives, where
the detection with notion of context outperforms the detection
without notion of context.
d) Setup 4: In this Setup, the order of reconfiguration
of IPCs again depends on the product as shown in table V.
Fig. 11. Difference of f-measures for Four Attacks in Setup 2
Fig. 12. Difference of f-measures for One Attack in Setup 3
The order of reprogramming the PLCs, however, is random for
each IPC respectively. The ROCs for one attack per sequence
can be seen in figure 13.
Fig. 13. The ROCs for One Attack per Sequence in Setup 4
Up to a threshold value of 0.2, the detection with consid-
eration of context performs significantly better. This can also
be seen in the f-measures, as depicted in figure 14.
The ROC for detection without context seems to decrease
in figure 13. This is mathematically impossible and is due to
an inaccuracy in plotting the graph.
Fig. 14. Difference of f-measures for One Attack in Setup 4
C. Results
Throughout the experiments, detection with consideration
of context always performs better than detection without
consideration of context. This outperformance can in some
cases be derived from the faster increasing ROC. In any
case, the f-measure of context-based detection is higher and
decreasing slower than the f-measure of non-context-based
detection. Therefore, the false negative rate of context-based
detection is lower than the false negative rate of context-less
detection.
Furthermore, it shows that the quality of detection, in terms
of ROCs, depends on the randomness of the valid actions. If
only strict patterns occur, detection is easy. However, if there
is a level of uncertainty, detection becomes more difficult, as
the transition matrices become more ambiguous.
Another interesting result lies in the discovery that the
order of attacks has very low influence on the detection rate.
This is probably because of the fact that the transition from
valid action to malicious action, and vice versa, serves as a
distinguishing event. Transitions within the malicious actions
are not necessary to detect them.
VI. CONCLUSION
Industrial systems and networks are typically more uniform
and deterministic than classic internet networks. This fact can
be used to aid in intrusion detection. If context information
is considered in conjunction with network information,
intelligence about the presence or absence of malicious
activities can be gained more easily. Even though the
proposed experiment was a simplification of a real industrial
network, the effect is noteworthy. Especially false positives
are significantly lower with than without notion of context. In
real-world applications, this is a highly important factor, as
each false positive will lead to investigation and consume time
and effort, resulting in high costs. A low false positive rate is
therefore critical for acceptance of an detection algorithm.
For our future work, we plan on creating a more so-
phisticated simulator on a packet base, so that frequency,
content, length and other properties of network traffic can
be observed. In addition to that, we plan on integrating host-
based information, such as log-entries or settings of production
tools, into the detection solution. This work suggests that this
will lead to an increase in detection with a decrease in false
positives.
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